The Social Contract in the MENA region and the Energy Sector Reforms
Abstract: during the last few years and because of the low oil prices in particular, the increasing

awareness of the unsustainability of subsidized systems led several MENA countries to take steps to
lower subsidies, which have been part of the social contract for decades, especially as far as the
energy sector is concerned.
Nowadays, the need for reforms is compelling for more than one reason. Namely, the subsidised
system distorts market trends, fosters inefficient use of resources, depresses foreign direct
investment and fuels overconsumption, which is no longer sustainable, particularly as far as the
population growth in most of the MENA countries is concerned.
In this paper both the resource-abundant countries and the energy importing nations will be
analysed, in order to investigate similarities and differences between the two and to carry out an
initial assessment of the reforms in two representative countries, namely Saudi Arabia, exporting
country par excellence, and Egypt, which imports energy.
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Introduction
After the Arab uprisings, the debate over the concept of social contract, which relates to the
processes of creation and legitimization of authority and the response of individuals and societal
aggregates, acquired unprecedented significance in the whole MENA region.
Shortly after the turmoil, subsidy spending has risen in response to the greater social demands that
have accompanied the wave of political transitions in the area.
Nevertheless, after the first post-revolutionary phase, the increasing awareness of the
unsustainability of subsidized systems led several MENA countries to take steps to lower subsidies,
which have been part of the social contract for decades, especially as far as the energy sector is
concerned.
For many years, reducing energy subsidies in the MENA region has represented a sort of taboo. For
citizens, energy subsidies have served as a key social safety net, while for rulers, they have been
used as a tool for limiting democracy and equality demands and forcing people to comply with the
political status quo.
At the same time, Middle Eastern and North African countries were exposed to the conflicting
pressures exerted by international institutions like the International Energy Agency (IEA), the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to limit national spending for subsidies.
Nowadays, the need for reforms is compelling for more than one reason. Namely, the subsidised
system distorts market trends, fosters inefficient use of resources, depresses foreign direct
investment and fuels overconsumption, which is no longer sustainable, particularly as far as the
population growth in most of the MENA countries is concerned.
Given these pressures and the enormous constraints that energy subsidies place on government
budgets, between 2013 and 2014 nearly thirty countries undertook energy sector reforms,1 among
which there are Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, United Arab Emirates, while Saudi Arabia inaugurated
projects of reforms in 2015.
In addition, since June 2014 global oil prices have fallen substantially, further exacerbating already
existing pressures on national fiscal budgets.
“Perhaps more importantly, falling oil prices have given local leadership an argument to work on
reforms, albeit cautiously”.2
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Clearly, each country in the GCC, or wider MENA region for that matter, has its own political
dynamics and unique political economy. Particularly, hydrocarbon producers possess different
characteristics from resource-importing countries.
Therefore, in this paper both the former and the latter instances of energy contexts are analysed.
The first chapter, The social contract in the MENA region before and after the Arab Springs,
provides an overview of the significance of subsidies in the framework of the social contract in the
MENA region, underlining the impact of the Arab Springs3 on the debate concerning the need for
reforms.
Moreover, it analyses the very term social contract and its significance in the framework of the
energy production and supply in the area.
The second section of the study, Exporting countries, focuses on the resource-abundant states and
their peculiar features.
The concept of rentier state is put into perspective to observe the contemporary trends and the
resource-curse theories - which suggest that many social evils are caused by the resource abundancy
- are contextualized within the MENA region, underlying both their fundamental insights and their
shortcomings.
In the last part of this chapter the analysis is carried out through the case study concerning Saudi
Arabia and the reforms that the Kingdom is undertaking, which are compared to the steps taken in
the last few years by countries with similar features, such as United Arab Emirates.
By contrast, in the third chapter, Importing countries, the research deals with the context of MENA
nations that import resources, providing a comparison of the subsidies’ management of importing
and exporting countries.
In order to highlight similarities and differences occurring among various Middle Eastern and North
African countries, the case of Egypt is analysed and confronted with other scenarios.
Indeed, the fundamental hypothesis is that subsidy reforms are becoming increasingly compelling
both in exporting and in importing MENA countries, despite their economic, social, political and
historical differences.
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1. The social contract in the MENA region before and after the Arab Springs

a. Subsidies and the social contract: a conceptual framework
For many years in the MENA region, both in importing and exporting countries, energy
subsidies have played a major role in implementing and consolidating peculiar forms of
social contract between rulers and society.
Nevertheless, the concepts behind those terms imply a heterogeneous set of cases and
situations, and scholars do not always clarify the notions of subsidies and social contract.
As far as the very term “subsidy” is concerned, there is no universally accepted definition of
this word, and international organizations such as the International Energy Agency (IEA),
World Trade Organization (WTO), and International Monetary Fund (IMF) have different
definitions.
One of the most effective definitions characterizes subsidies as measures that keep prices for
consumers below the market level, keep prices for producers above the market level, or
reduce costs for consumers and producers by giving direct or indirect support.
Subsidies for fossil fuels, such as oil, gas and coal, take several forms and are provided
along the full value chain from exploration to production and consumption.
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO) definition, subsidies include:
all government financial contributions or direct support;
transfer of risk through provision of debt, equity and guarantees;
forgone revenue through tax breaks;
provision of infrastructure, goods and services below market value; and 5) royalty
breaks and investment in infrastructure.4

In general, the unit subsidy is calculated as the difference between the actual selling price of
a product or service and a benchmark price that reflects the free market value.
Moreover, energy subsidies can be either explicit or implicit. To give an example of the
explicit form, international companies operating in Algeria are required by law to sell a
4
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certain percentage of their produced natural gas domestically, at prices significantly lower
than the international price.
An example of an implicit subsidy is a government in an oil producing country mandating
the state owned oil producing company to sell their products at a cost that is above the
production cost, yet far below the international market price.
In other words, subsidies are not always as visible as it may seem. “Interventions to reduce
the price of goods and services can be channelled through budget transfers directly to
consumers or producers (explicit subsidies) or through administrative setting of prices
without compensating budget appropriations (implicit subsidies).
Moreover, pre-tax consumer subsidies arise when the price paid by consumers (that is, firms
and households) is below the cost of supplying energy.
On the contrary, post-tax consumer subsidies arise when the price paid by consumers is
below the supply cost of energy plus an appropriate ‘Pigouvian’ (or ‘corrective’) tax that
reflects the environmental damage associated with energy consumption and an additional
consumption tax that should be applied to all consumption goods for raising revenues”.5
At the same time, the concept of social contract is even more complex than that of subsidy.
It refers to theories, originated during the Age of Enlightenment, concerning the
relationships between national authority and citizens.
According to the basic meaning of the social contract, individuals voluntarily surrender
some of their freedoms – and rights – in exchange of protection and services.
In Thomas Hobbes’s perspective, without social contract people used to leave in a state of
nature, characterized by violence of all against all, insecurity and uncertainty.6
In order to acquire better living conditions and escape from this state of nature, societies
rationally consent to give up their natural freedoms to obtain benefits from a political,
structured order.
In this perspective, the notion of social contract is strictly intertwined with the debate on
energy subsidies, the resource course theories and the concept of rentier state,7 as the social
contract in the MENA region pivots on the strategic redistribution of rents.8
As mentioned above, a key outcome of the Arab uprisings has been a significant increase in
the prices needed by the countries to manage their fiscal positions. Stated differently, in the
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aftermath of the turmoil, the surviving Arab regimes and the new ones needed to meet the
basic needs of their populations. Failure to meet these expectations would contribute to the
growing radicalization and opposition.
Such a strategy required increasing public spending on crucial socio-economic necessities
such as jobs and subsidies. These issues are likely to represent long-term challenges for
MENA countries, which might be related to the so-called resource curse theories.
According to these theories, resource endowments are not a blessing but a curse – one that
constrains growth, feeds corruption and fuels conflict.
At the same time, the charge that natural-resources abundance retards political change and
entrenches regimes finds its milestone in the concept of rentier state.
The members of the rentier elites capture natural-resource rents and use them to create
patronage networks that consolidate their power. It is argued that these elites have strong
vested interests in maintaining the status quo and thus act to suppress criticism and potential
political challengers through a sort of tacit agreement with citizens: low fiscal pressure in
exchange of low democratic demands.9
Both the resource curse theories and the concept of rentier state will be analysed in the
following sections of the study.
Particularly, these notions will be investigated in the second chapter, which will be centred
on resource-abundant MENA countries.

b. The social contract before the Arab Springs: economic and social effects of
subsidies
As far as the MENA region is concerned, most of the countries apply energy subsidies, from
Algeria to Iran, from Egypt to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the region accounts for
50 per cent of global pre-tax energy subsidies, representing over 8.5 per cent of regional
GDP or 22 per cent of total government revenues.10
For decades, Middle Eastern autocracies sought the approval of the populace through the
provision of food and other essentials at below-market prices. Described as the democracy
of bread by Tunisian scholar Larbi Sadiki11, the 1973 rise in global commodity prices
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cemented the practice of subsidization so securely that, despite a number of attempts to
reduce them over the years, they represent a significant part of domestic policies to this day.
In 1977 for instance, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat attempted to remove the flour, rice
and cooking oil subsidies: the result was a near-revolution that saw hundreds of thousands
of protesters descend on the capital and the hasty re-implementation of the subsidy system.

In the last few years, energy subsidies has become increasingly unsustainable in the whole
MENA region.
Obviously, the low prices of oil have been one of the major reasons for the increasing
unsustainability of subsidised system.
Indeed, with lower prices exporting countries gain smaller revenues, thus suffering from a
greater fiscal pressure.
The decline in oil prices that began in the middle of 2014 presents an opportunity for
governments to reform their fuel subsidies and face several unresolved social issues.
Indeed, the subsidized system systematically fosters a number of economic and social
tensions that – without seriously implemented reforms - are likely to increase in the near
future.
From an economical perspective, according to IMF estimates, pre-tax energy subsidies in
the region amounted to $237 billion in 2011, equivalent to 48 percent of world subsidies, 8.6
percent of regional GDP, or 22 percent of government revenue.12
In the MENA region, “energy subsidies account for the bulk of subsidies. About 50 per cent
of the total cost of pre-tax energy subsidies ($119.3 billion or 4.3 percent of GDP) is related
to petroleum products, another 23 per cent ($55.2 billion or 2 per cent of GDP) to natural
gas, and 26 per cent ($62 billion or 2.3 per cent of GDP) to electricity”.13
Electricity subsidies are widespread in the MENA region, but their magnitude is more
difficult to estimate with precision because of lack of data and the complexity of
subsidization modalities. Generally, subsidies arise when electricity revenues are below
production costs. This may occur when tariffs are set below cost recovery levels, when
illegal connection and leakages are widespread, or when revenue collection is low, reflecting
the so-called nontechnical losses.
Pre-tax electricity subsidies are above 2 per cent of GDP in close to half of the MENA
countries, with Lebanon and Jordan bearing the highest subsidy bill in 2011.
12
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In contrast, food subsidies amounted to $21.6 billion or 0.7 percent of GDP in 2011.
In addition, many countries maintain subsidies on water, financial products, medicines,
housing, and other products and services that are difficult to measure.
As highlighted by Prasad, Abdel Moneim and Martinez, accounting for the full economic,
social and environmental costs and benefits of subsidies for fossil fuels, along with the
development of other government interventions to achieve the same objectives, has led to
demands to start removing them.14
As a matter of common knowledge, the subsidised system presents more than one
shortcoming. Namely, energy subsidies can inhibit sustainable economic development by
creating a burden on government budgets and reduce resources that could be put to more
efficient use within the economy.
Furthermore, from a social perspective, subsidies tend to increase social and economic
inequality by undermining access to affordable energy and benefiting the rich rather than the
poorest members of society.
Indeed, the choice of selling energy at a lower price favours the rich, because their
consumption rates are normally higher than the national average.
Several studies have found that subsidies to fossil-fuel use tend to benefit high-income
households more than the poor, due to the former’s higher per capita consumption levels.
According to the IEG study, the bottom 40 per cent of the population in terms of income
distribution received only 15-20 per cent of the fuel subsidies in developing countries.15
Inevitably, these recurrent social patterns have the potential to foster interclass tensions and
low-income people’s dissatisfaction and resentment.
In addition, in the recent past the ruling élites benefitted from these peculiar conjunctures
even because they simply did not use to pay for energy, as the case of Algerian and Egyptian
army apparatuses and the Saudi Royal Family clearly demonstrate.
Moreover, opponents to the subsidised system notice that energy subsidies are likely to
reduce the competitiveness of key industries, including low-carbon businesses, by
discouraging investment in renewable energy and energy efficiency.
As far as the overconsumption is concerned, which is fostered by subsidies, it is worth
noting that it may also compromise energy security16 and public health.
14
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Experts, rulers and business actors in the Middle East and North Africa are becoming
increasingly aware about the exigence of reforming energy subsidies and the weaknesses of
a subsidised system.
So far, according to Sdralevich, Sab, Zouhar, and Albertin,17 MENA countries that apply
subsidies could be broadly classified in three categories:

Countries that set the prices of goods and services below the cost of importation or
domestic production, and cover the ensuing pre-tax subsidies through fiscal or
quasi-fiscal resources (e.g., electricity in Lebanon and petroleum products in Egypt);
Countries where prices are set high enough to cover goods and services’ supply
costs, but not enough to be consistent with prevailing tax rates, giving rise to a posttax subsidy in the form of foregone tax revenues. Some countries have automatic
price adjustment mechanisms for certain products (especially fuels, as is the case in
Jordan, Mauritania, and Morocco);

Natural resource–rich countries where domestic fuel prices are below international
prices, reflecting the low cost of domestic extraction, as the case of Saudi Arabia
reveals.
Despite these differences, subsidies’ weaknesses have become increasingly evident all over the
region.
The Gulf countries for instance, do not have enough electricity to supply the overconsuming
domestic market, and blackouts are the norm in many periods of the year.
Similarly, in North Africa, the yearly increase in energy consumption is 6-7%, that is to say that the
consumption is likely to double within a decade or little more.
Before dealing with the in-depth analysis of two fundamental case studies in the following chapters
of the inquiry, an overview of some significant scenarios may enhance the understanding of the
urgency in reforms.

Morocco

17
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In Morocco, due to demographic and economic growth, electricity demand grew at
an average annual rate of 6.7% from 2003 to 2013, leading to an energy consumption
of 32,015 GWh at the end of that year. Annual consumption per capita has steadily
increased from 483 kWh in 2002 to 843 kWh in 2013.
Morocco’s energy subsidy bill at its peak in 2012 had become almost the size of the
overall fiscal deficit, as much as spending on investment, and more than the
spending on health and education combined, according to IMF figures.
Egypt18
As far as Egypt is concerned, over the past five years, the annual energy production
grew on average by 1% compared to annual average consumption growth of 5.3%,
thus creating an increasing gap between supply and demand.19
Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa, and the continent’s largest
consumer of oil and natural gas, which account for 94% of Egypt’s primary energy
consumption. Energy demand is increasing rapidly as the result of population
growth. This increased demand is posing a challenge for Egypt’s government as
production of oil and gas is falling, and oil consumption has outpaced production
since 2010. Combined with aging infrastructure this is causing frequent electricity
blackouts.
In 2013, subsidies to fossil fuel consumption accounted for 12% of Egypt’s GDP or
US$32 billion and absorbed around 20% of public spending (exceeding expenditure
on health, education and infrastructure combined), making Egypt the world’s eighth
largest spender on fossil fuel subsidies.20 Motor fuels and LPG are subsidised for
general consumption, and natural gas and fuel subsidies are provided to energyintensive industries in order to promote their competitiveness. A World Bank study
in 2005 estimated that a 50% reduction in energy subsidies and a uniform
distribution of the savings to the population could reduce poverty in the country by
33%.
Moreover, expenditure on a variety of fuels accounts for around 70% of total
spending on subsidies, and Egypt imports a number of fuel types – including around
50% of the butane, which is widely used in canister form by Egyptian households.
18
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The lower security in the wake of the 2011 uprising led to a marked increase in
illegal butane trading, which in turn resulted in the reduced availability of subsidised
stock. The subsequent protests, which accompanied each butane crisis, served as a
reminder of the politically sensitive nature of the subsidy question.
As in the other MENA countries, the subsidized system proved to favour the
economic – and political – élites. In 2013 for instance, the Egyptian Ministry of
Petroleum found that 92% of petrol subsidies and 66% of natural gas subsidies went
to the richest 20% of consumers.21
According to other estimates, Egypt’s expenditure on energy subsidies reached a
staggering EGP143.7 billion (close to USD21 billion) in the financial year 2013/14,
a figure representing 19.5 per cent of total government spending, or almost the entire
value of aid received by Egypt from Middle Eastern donors since mid-2012.

Tunisia
In Tunisia, another North African state, in 2011 natural gas accounted for 45% of
total primary energy consumption, oil for 40%, and biomass for 15%. In 2013, 98%
of Tunisia’s electricity was generated from fossil fuels, primarily natural gas. Since
the mid-1980s, Tunisia’s petroleum production has steadily declined, and the
country is currently a net importer of oil and gas. As energy demand is expected to
grow by 4% annually between 2010 and 2030, large investments in the energy sector
are needed, part of which the government plans to meet with renewable energy
sources, including the aim to produce 11% of electricity from renewables by 2016
and 25% by 2030.
Tunisia subsidises fossil fuels in a number of ways, with the stated parallel
objectives of ensuring the competitiveness of energy intensive industries and
supporting social welfare. Historically, the largest subsidies have been for LPG and
diesel by applying fuel and electricity price controls.
The government compensates the energy companies for the difference between the
set natural gas and petroleum prices and the corresponding international prices.
Energy subsidy costs tripled from an average of 0.9% of GDP in 2010 to 2.6% of
GDP in 2012, as domestic retail prices were kept artificially low while international
oil prices were rising. “In addition to placing an unsustainable burden on the
government’s budget, the energy subsidies are an inefficient means to ensure social
21
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protection since the richest households capture 40 times more benefit from them
than do low-income households”.22
The Tunisian government has attempted to reform these subsidies several times
between 2005 and 2009, but has often reversed reforms in response to protests linked
to unemployment and rising living costs.
Saudi Arabia
Saudi Arabia is the largest oil-consuming nation in the Middle East. For instance, the
country consumed 2.9 million barrels per day of oil in 2013, almost double the
consumption in 2000, because of strong industrial growth and subsidised prices.23
The country often does not produce enough electricity to supply the overconsuming
domestic market, and blackouts are the norm in many periods of the year, like in the
other Gulf countries.
In fact, irregular energy services are a consequence of both the overconsumption and
the decade-long underinvestment in electricity generation and distribution networks,
which characterized many countries of the MENA region.
In this respect, el-Katiri and Fattouh claim that this situation is further exacerbated
by a culture of non-payment of utility bills by some parts of the population.24
Far from being erroneous, speaking about a culture of non-payment should be
simplistic and misleading.
Indeed, as mentioned above, ruling élites such as the army in the case of Egypt and
the Royal Family in Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates do not pay their
energy consumption. Nonetheless, it is a matter of customary privileges, which do
not belong to the population in general and are causing an increasing resentment
among citizens.
What is undeniable is that the abovementioned blackouts proportionally affect
middle-income households and small businesses more than any other social group,
and long waiting times for new electricity connections for private households and
businesses are often the consequence.
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These brief country overviews imply that, in order to keep pace with the consumption, states should
double consumption every decade or little more. Unquestionably, this is an impossible option.
Consequently, as evident progressively throughout the 2000s, energy subsidies constitute a
significant fiscal burden.
In this respect, El-Katiri and Fattouh underlined in 2015 that, with rising world market prices for oil
and natural gas since the early 2000s, the MENA region’s parallel surge in domestic demand has
translated into a rapid growth in fiscal expenditure on energy subsidies in importing countries such
as Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. Yemen’s energy subsidy bill for 2013/14 for
instance, was most recently estimated at around USD3.5 billion, a third of government expenditure
and in excess of the country’s budgeted deficit of USD3.2 billion in the fiscal year.25
Despite this situation, MENA countries procrastinated reforms. Two fundamental concerns
restrained rulers from implementing effective subsidy reforms.
Firstly, they were well aware that removing subsidies would have hurt élites and internal powers
that use to support them and providing votes for them.
Secondly, authorities feared that, without subsidies, populace would have been less obliging to the
status quo.26
In spite of these prolonged hesitations, international pressures insisted in highlighting the subsidy
emergency.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) for instance, has been invoking subsidy reform since more
than a decade. In a recent report, it highlights that energy subsidies are dramatically higher than
previously thought. Estimates for global energy subsidies in 2011 have been revised to US $ 4.2
trillion, more than double the US $ 2.0 trillion previously reported in a 2013 IMF book, Energy
Subsidy Reform: Lessons and Implications.27
According to the IMF, the sustained interest in energy subsidy reform also reflects increasing
recognition of the perverse environmental, fiscal, macroeconomic, and social consequences of
energy subsidies.
Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6 percent
of global GDP), cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20 percent, and cut pre-mature air pollution
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deaths by more than half. After allowing for the higher energy costs faced by consumers, this action
would raise global economic welfare by $1.8 trillion (2.2 percent of global GDP).28
The approach of the World Bank is similar to that of the FMI. In 2014 for instance, the World Bank
created a new facility to help countries reform their energy subsidies and put in place social
protection measures to help the poor during this transition. The Energy Subsidy Reform Technical
Assistance and Delivery Facility, led by the Bank’s Energy Sector Management Assistance
Program (ESMAP), is already supporting World Bank engagements in a number of regions.
More explicitly, foreign economic assistance programs are usually subordinated to the will of
governments to implement subsidy reforms.29
For all these reasons, in the whole MENA regions governments were exposed to contrasting
pressures. On a domestic perspective, they refrain reforms in order to avoid protests and loss of
consensus. Internationally, institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank
increased their soliciting about reforms.

1.3 The post-revolutionary paths between fears and changes
During the first decade of the 21st century, the issue of greater socio-economic justice acquired new
significance in the whole MENA region and began to play a major role at the heart of MENA
politics.
From Tunisia to Egypt, from Libya to Saudi Arabia, from Algeria to Bahrain, citizens invaded
squares and streets to claim ḥurrīa wa karāma, “freedom and dignity”, two concepts that have been
variably conjugated.
It is licit to talk about revolutions only in some cases, namely those of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria,
Yemen, and Bahrain.
Nevertheless, in the whole MENA region a wave of protests shook not only the power, but also the
very conception of democracy and civil society.
The fundamental instances of protesters were the same in every country of the area:
high unemployment rates;
deep dissatisfaction of the youngsters, which represented the breeding ground for the
protests; widespread social imbalances, caused and exacerbated by a range of
different social, political, economic and ethnical factors;
repressive and authoritarian power combined with extended violations of civil rights
such as freedom of speech, press and assembly;
28
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high levels of corruption in both the private and public sectors.

Given these premises, Tunisia was the first country to begin the revolution. On December 17, 2010
Mohammed Bouazizi, a young Tunisian street vendor, set himself on fire protesting against the
confiscation of his wares.
After Tunisia, turmoil propagated in Egypt at the end of January 2011 and on February 11, 2011,
Hosni Mubarak resigned and power was transferred to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
(SCAF), and then in all the above mentioned countries.
During the Arab Springs, for the first time in contemporary Arab history, people expressed their
discontent in organized and extremely effective ways.
These events obtained extensive media coverage but, most importantly, they ousted rulers who had
governed for decades and shook regimes in the whole area.
Therefore, the exigence of reforms and the international pressures clashed with fears of a new wave
of protests.
For this reason, in the aftermath of the turmoil all governments guaranteed or even increased energy
subsidies.
The challenging economic environment and rising social demands have increased risks to
macroeconomic stability. “Governments have responded to high commodity prices and growing
social hardship by increasing spending—including on wages and food and fuel subsidies—even as
revenues faltered. As a result, fiscal deficits in oil-importing countries increased in 2012 to about
8.5 percent of GDP on average from 5 percent in 2009, levels that are increasingly difficult to
sustain. Even in oil-exporting countries, which have performed relatively well, expansionary
policies have pushed fiscal and current account breakeven oil prices upwards”.30
Nevertheless, soon after the restauration of a sufficient degree of stability, the shortcomings of a
subsidised system became more evident, and citizens begun to understand that energy subsidies
were largely inequitable as they naturally accrue most to the largest users – energy-intensive
industries, and medium-to high-income households.
Petroleum product subsidies in particular benefit primarily the urban middle class, and households
that can afford a car.
Therefore, the reform issue regained momentum, especially because the first MENA examples of
subsidy reforms provide little evidence of the often-feared social backlash. Even though there are a
number of cases where indeed price increases caused protests and upheaval (e.g. Indonesia and
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Kuwait), it is undeniable that younger generations in particular have a better appreciation of the
actual costs of resources like water and electricity, and more affinity with conservation and
sustainability, and therefore do not per definition obstruct change.
In this respect, UAE are a case in point. It is one of the tenth-largest oil and gas producers and it
holds the seventh-largest proven oil reserves worldwide. It is a major oil exporter and oil and gas
revenues account for about 80% of government revenues. The UAE has one of the world’s highest
rates of petroleum consumption per capita. It has succeeded in shifting almost all power
consumption to gas but is increasing gas imports because domestic production of natural gas has not
kept pace with demand.
The IMF estimates that fossil fuel subsidies in the UAE (pre-tax and foregone consumption tax
revenue) were US$22 billion in 2013, and fell to US$16 billion in 2015. Despite the UAE’s large
subsidies to fuels (petrol, diesel, kerosene and LPG), it has the highest petrol prices in the Gulf.
This has led to the smuggling of petroleum products from neighbouring Oman and Saudi Arabia,
where petrol prices are much cheaper.
The UAE is one of the few countries in the Gulf region that has attempted gradually to increase
electricity and fuel prices with the aim of curbing the strong growth in the consumption of
electricity and petrol and diesel for transport and reducing dependence on subsidies.
In 2010, the price of petrol across the UAE was raised by 26% to a still low of US$0.47 per litre,
and this price has increased to US$0.53 per litre as of September 2015.31
Nevertheless, we have to be cautious about transferring previous lessons one-on-one to other cases.
MENA countries’ profiles show multiple differences in terms of demographics, education,
employment distribution, sustainability awareness, and these different features are likely to affect
the path to reform.
In the last few years, the wind has been changing and many Middle Eastern and North African
countries has begun to consider the hypothesis of structural subsidies’ reform.
In order to analyse the different reform processes that are now occurring in the region, a
fundamental distinction should be made between resource-abundant countries and importing
countries, thus exemplifying the variations in reforms’ implementation and evaluating the
likelihood of reforms’ success in countries with extremely different features.
Therefore, in the following chapters of the present study two instances of subsidised systems will be
analysed. The case of Saudi Arabia, a resource-abundant country, will be compared to the example
of Egypt, an importing nation.
31
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2. Exporting countries
Energy exporting countries and resources abundant nations often represent the subsidised system
par excellence.
In resource-abundant countries, the natural resource rents, particularly in concentrated form, foster
the mechanism according to which, to stay in power, the governments need to find a way to
redistribute rents to favoured group, and this tends to go to the detriment of effective and consistent
political economy.
As far as the Gulf region is concerned, in Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrein,
Kuwait and Oman, subsidies have been applied to energy and other necessities for many decades.
They were intrinsically part of the aforementioned social contract and used to have a strong impact
over society, economics and politics.
The pre-oil economies of the communities distributed along the shoreline of the Gulf were
dominated by the pearl industry, which forged social relationships and hierarchies within a
segmented labour force.
This is the reason why the pearl became the heritage symbol of the modern Gulf States and it
appeared on banknotes and monuments throughout the region.
Once that oil had been discovered, the Gulf region started taking on some of the features it still
shows. Oil was first discovered in the Middle East in southwest Persia in 1908 and later was found
in commercial quantities in northern Iraq in 1927. Exploration quickly began in the neighbouring
Gulf sheikhdoms, where geological conditions were similar to those of resource-abundant areas in
Iran.
Elsewhere in the Gulf events followed a similar pattern, with the exception the modern United Arab
Emirates and Oman, where oil became a significant resource only several decades later.
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As far as the exports are concerned, oil began to be exported in commercial quantities in the late
1940s and production rose rapidly in the 1950s and 1960s. This coincided with the independence of
Kuwait (1961) and the UAE, Bahrain, and Qatar (1971).
During the last decades, the energy sector, both as far as oil and gas are concerned, has been hugely
subsidised.
In the last few years however, the high number of weaknesses and shortcomings of the subsidised
system and the evolving energy consumption patterns in the region led governments to reorient their
policies and to begin a series of gradual subsidies reforms.
Perhaps most importantly, the decline in oil prices that began in the middle of 201432 speeded up
the process, as the fiscal position of the Gulf countries was becoming increasingly delicate.
Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) economies are largely volatile due to their almost exclusive
reliance on natural resources.
Therefore, in 2014 budget surpluses quickly turned into deficits. The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) has projected that lower oil prices cost Arab oil exporters some US$360 billion in lost
revenues in 2015 and predicted that the six GCC states will face a cumulative fiscal deficit of as
much as US$1 trillion over the next five years.33
Government revenues in Oman for example fell by 35.9 percent in the first nine months of 2015 on
the back of a 45.5 percent decline in oil revenues, while in Qatar the value of hydrocarbon exports
has plunged 40.5 percent year-on-year between since July 2014.
The initial impacts from subsidy reforms have reduced GCC energy subsidies from 6.5 percent of
GDP in 2013 to 3.4 percent in 2015.34
Kuwait for instance, recorded a 45.2 percent year-on-year fall in government revenues for the first
eight months of the 2015–16 fiscal year and a near-identical 46.1 percent drop in oil revenues over
the same period.35
The scale and severity of the budgetary shortfalls caused by the continuing low price of oil
throughout 2015 eventually left Gulf officials with little choice but to introduce various measures
intended to bring spending down from surplus-fueled highs.
Therefore, Gulf States are emblematic examples of the changes occurring when resource-abundant
countries gradually recognise the need for reform.
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Moreover, Gulf States represents an extremely interesting area of research because of their
peculiarities and major demographic and economic traits, which allowed governments to maintain
the subsidised system for such a long period.
Bahrein, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar have less than 5 million inhabitants, of whom between 44
(Oman) and 85.7 (Qatar) percent are non-nationals.36
Saudi Arabia has a partially different demographic landscape. With about 31 million inhabitants and
32.3 percent of non-nationals, it is the largest and most populated country in the region.
By contrast, United Arab Emirates have little more than 8 million inhabitants but the percentage of
non-national raises above 88 percent.37
How these different demographic ratios affect the likelihood of reforms’ success will be included in
this section of the paper.
Historically, abundance of natural resources and contained numbers of inhabitants have been the
first two fundamental features which fostered the creation of the so-called rentier state, a system
whose existence is indeed favoured by resources and small populations, in which the state derives a
substantial portion of its national revenues from the rent of local resources to external clients.

2.1 The concept of rentier state
In the energy sector, the concept of rentier state refers to the relationship between natural resources
and political power. More precisely, it is a system of managing natural resources and revenues
derived from the energy sector.
According to the classical theories of rentier state38, the members of the rentier elites capture
natural-resource rents and use them to create patronage networks that consolidate their power.
This mechanism is based on a sort of a tacit agreement between those who detain power and
citizens: low fiscal pressure and high standard of welfare - which are both possible thanks to the
revenues from the energy sector- in return for low democratic demands and compliance with the
political status quo.
Indeed, the naturally occurring wealth of rentier states precludes the need to extract income from
their citizenry, and the population of those rentier states expect an income not in return for work but
merely by virtue of their collective communal identity as citizens of those states.39
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In the framework of a rentier state, it is argued that the ruling classes have strong stakes in
maintaining the status quo and thus act to suppress criticism, potential political challengers and
internal dissent.
Historically, this phenomenon has always been a self-reinforcing mechanism, in which centralized
wealth serves to consolidate the political hold of the elites.
With special reference to the Arab states, Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani pointed out four
main characteristics of a rentier state:
Rent situations predominate.
The economy does not require a powerful domestic productive sector, as it counts on
external rents.
Only a small proportion of the working population is actually involved in the generation of
the rent.
Consequently, for the majority of citizens income and wealth do not come as the result of
work but rather are the result of natural resource abundance.40
The government is the principal recipient of the external rent.41

Because the category of rentier state is particularly exemplified in the Gulf region, this theory has
been immediately associated with the oil-producing countries of this area.
Given these characteristics, rentier state theories aim at explaining highly complex issues such as
the predominance of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, the apparent lack of success of the
Western model of democracy in the region and the deficit of popular representation.
Summarizing, it is not hazardous to state that the “no taxation without representation” paradigm
seems to be reversed in the Gulf countries, as regimes sought to co-opt socio-political support
through the spread of wealth and exhibited varying degrees of autonomy from societal demands or
pressures.42
Particularly, Fareed Zakaria argued that, in the absence of taxes, citizens have only minor reasons
for requiring the government to be responsive to their needs. According to Zakaria, the government
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essentially “bribes” the citizens with extensive social welfare programs, becoming a distributive
state.43
As a matter of fact, subsidies in general, and those applied to energy in particular, represent one of
the most powerful means to perpetuate the rentier state existence, as they may function as an
excellent deterrent against internal dissent.44
Inevitably, the status of rentier states of many Gulf countries has evolved since the publication of
the work of Beblawi and Luciani in 1988. Those nations for instance, have adopted increasingly
sophisticated means for governing their finances and have become significant players in global
financial markets, while beginning to plan for the time when they would run out of non-renewable
resources.45
As far as the contemporary rentier states in the Gulf region are concerned, Matthew Gray
introduced the theory of “Late Rentierism", hypothesizing that, in the more recent version of
rentierism, states are more entrepreneurial as compared to its tradition-bound predecessors, as well
as more supportive of development.46
At the same time, the “Late Rentierism” theory highlights that the fundamental features of the
rentier states remain unaltered, along with the absence of any significant democratic transition
towards democracy.

2.2 Resource curse theories and the Dutch disease
The rentier state theories, implying that the rentier state’s main characteristics tend to undermine
democratization and power-citizenry dialogue, are strictly linked with another strand of research,
i.e. that relating to the so-called resource curse theories.
According to these theories, resource endowments are not a blessing but a curse – one that
constrains growth, feeds corruption and fuels conflict.
The hypothesis of a curse of natural resources can be traced back to the 1970s. The subsequent two
decades saw the emergence of a significant body of research proposing a link between resource
production and various socio-political ills.
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The contents of these theories seem to be largely corroborated by the fact that numerous resourceexporting countries have failed to diversify their economies away from the extractive sector and
they remain highly dependent on extractive revenues.
Such failure appears to be pronounced in the Gulf countries, which, though certainly more
prosperous than they would have been without oil and gas, remain highly vulnerable to price
shocks.
Linked to arguments about the centralization of wealth is the charge that natural-resources
abundance retards political change and entrenches regimes, which finds its milestone in the
abovementioned concept of rentier state.
Moreover, even if there is no active conflict, these revenues still tend to generate much higher levels
of military spending to protect resources, which does not always contributes to internal stability.
Another strand of research that connects resource-abundance with social issues and illnesses relates
to the so-called Dutch disease.
The term Dutch disease refers to the negative effects on manufacturing industries that took place in
the Netherlands after the natural gas discoveries in the 1970s and before, and the process of real
currency appreciation that followed.47
As a matter of common knowledge, similar setbacks affected many oil-exporting countries
following the oil price shocks of the same decade.
The hypothesis underlying the concept of Dutch disease implies that a natural resource boom comes
close to being a serious problem because specialization in natural resource intensive goods can be
harmful to long-term growth.48
Indeed, increasing success in a sector may cause the decline in other sectors because, as revenues or
foreign investments increase in the growing sector, the nation's currency becomes stronger. This
results in the nation's other exports becoming more expensive for other countries and imports
becoming cheaper, making those sectors less competitive.49
Like in the case of the resource curse theories, according to Dutch disease’s theorists, economic and
productive disequilibria may cause social tensions and resentment, primarily due to the fact that an
aggressive competition for employment takes place in the growing sector while the remaining
sectors are being marginalised.
47
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Unquestionably, despite these powerful insights, this body of research presents more than one
shortcoming, essentially attributable to the will of finding a one-size-fits-all explanation, which
tends to overlook the peculiarities of every country in the region.
For these reasons, highlighting the characteristics of a real process of subsidy reform through the
analysis of a chosen country may be useful to point out causes, push factor, developments and
expected outcomes of reforms, as well as to find elements that are likely to be reproduced in other
countries of the area.

2.3 Case study: Saudi Arabia and its precedents: is the Kingdom really changing its
conception of energy?
Before dealing with the case of Saudi Arabia, whose subsidy reform is still ongoing, it is worth
analysing the most significant precedent in the region, i.e. the reforms roadmap drawn by the United
Arab Emirates in the last few years.50
The UAE is one of the tenth-largest oil and gas producers and it holds the seventh-largest proven oil
reserves worldwide. Moreover, oil and gas revenues account for about 80% of government
revenues.51
Given these peculiar features of the energy sector, analysing the Emirati reforms may shed a light
on the potential implementation strategies in the whole area.
Moreover, the UAE is one of the countries that has first attempted to gradually increase electricity
and fuel prices with the aim of contrasting the strong growth in the consumption rates and reducing
dependence on subsidies.
Indeed, the state has been able to reduce direct energy subsidies from over 20 to 12.6 billion dollars
from 2013 to 2015, achieving a reduction of about 30 percent.52
Even before, in 2011, a 15 percent to 20 percent increase in the cost of electricity and water was
introduced for residential expats -i.e. non-nationals- industry, and government.
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Besides, for UAE nationals, who count for less than 12 percent of total population, a modest
electricity tariff increase was introduced, along with a contained water tariff for nationals with a
consumption level exceeding 20,000 imperial gallons (IG)53 per month.
What represented the main push-factor that led UAE towards subsidies’ reform was the soaring
demand for energy resources: gradually, the demand was overcoming supplies.
Since the beginning of the reform path in 2011, electricity and water prices have increased
significantly,54 even though, judged with international standards, they remain modest.
Interestingly, the peculiar demographic landscape of the United Arab Emirates led authorities to
enforce reforms along particular implementation trajectories.
Indeed, in Dubai for instance, not all reforms apply to nationals. Indigenous people are exempted
from fuel surcharge, while electricity and water prices remain significantly lower for nationals than
for expats.
Similarly, in Abu Dhabi, the local populations did not suffered any significant change in their
subsidies’ pattern, while electricity price for residential expats rose about 40 percent.
Despite the clear gradualness of the Emirati reforms, it is undeniable that the process brought
momentous changes into the subsidised system.
For the first time for instance, citizens have to pay for their water usage.
As far as the implementation phase is concerned, authorities deployed a high level of
communication expertise and have been able to talk effectively with the population.
Dubai for instance, launched an extensive public relations campaign with a double aim. Firstly, it
illustrated the hows and whys of the incoming tariffs’ changes; secondly, it urged the population to
reduce consumption, providing daily-life examples of a smarter energy usage.55
In the 2014, Abu Dhabi began a similar campaign, spreading for the first time new messages about
sustainability and conservation, and encouraging the use of public transport and fuel-efficient
vehicles.
Regarding the industrial sector, in all the UAE for commercial and industrial users under 1
megawatt (MW) there was a 7 percent increase, and a 100 percent increase for industry users that
are larger than 1 MW during the summer peak, between 10 AM and 10 PM.
Globally assessed, commercial and industrial users saw their water costs rise by 82 percent.
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Moreover, at the end of July 2015, prices for gasoline and diesel were substantially reformed and
currently, even though not completely deregulated, they are set monthly by a commission based on
international prices.
Beside house owners and industries, subsidies for government entities were reformed too. From a
symbolic perspective, the impact of this change should not be underestimated.
For government bodies, the reform removed the subsidies on electricity, as well as on water
consumption.
As far as the United Arab Emirates example of subsidies’ reform is concerned, many experts
believe that it is too early for definitive conclusions. For instance, “Initial data indeed suggest a
drop in water usage of up to 10 percent, though other sources believe that 5 to 6 percent is more
reasonable”.56
With the exception of the United Arab Emirates, governments in the Gulf region have long been
reluctant to endorse reforms.
Nevertheless, in the last few years, the influence of the Emirati example partially affected the
neighbouring countries.
In January 2015, Kuwait announced and implemented an increase in fuel prices, but the move was
met with sharp criticism in Parliament and was swiftly reversed. In September 2015, the Kuwaiti
authorities made another try, announcing a new study aiming at individuating the potential
consequences of fuel subsidy reform.
In October 2015, the Sultanate of Oman announced that the country was likely to start with
additional gradual subsidy reforms in early 2016 to follow increased prices to industry for natural
gas that were set in early 2015, as relatively low oil prices are constraining the national budget.
In the richer Qatar, the new born governmental Foundation for Energy and Sustainable
Development called for subsidy reforms and the project is ongoing, even though is too early for a
complete assessment.
Due to the demographic, geographic and social differences, the transferability of the Emirati reform
to Saudi Arabia is far from being certain.
Particularly, the Kingdom of al-Saud has an extremely higher percentage of indigenous population
compared to the United Arab Emirates57, and all the Gulf reforms’ trajectories showed the will to
favour this social group over non-nationals.
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This responds to a wider policy of cultural nationalism that has been applied in many Gulf countries
in the last few years, aimed at contrasting the effects of the prolonged disequilibrium between
indigenous people and non-nationals workers.58
Despite these differences, however, since few years ago in Saudi Arabia, like in the other countries
of the region, authorities and citizens have been discussing the opportunity of subsidy reform.
With no civil nuclear plants and only a minuscule amount of solar generating capacity, Saudi
Arabia's domestic energy consumption currently relies almost exclusively on oil and gas.
Its domestic energy prices are among the lowest in the world and are heavily subsidised by the
government—a state of affairs that has contributed to energy consumption growth rates of close to
8% a year.
Moreover, some long-lasting practices worsened this complex situation. Until a few years ago for
instance, Saudi Arabia used to allocate crude oil for power stations. By so doing, power stations
used also the finer components, but this is unnecessary to the goal of producing electricity, to which
the less precious part of crude is sufficient.
The waste of fine components could have been avoided by converting crude oil to different
components before sending it to power stations for electricity production, thus freeing refined
products such as diesel fuel and ethane for other purposes.
As far oil products are concerned, Lucas Davis, a professor of business and economics at the
University of California at Berkeley, estimated that the global annual cost of the overconsumption
of gasoline and diesel alone is around $44bn and Saudi Arabia alone accounted for 27 per cent of
the total global loss.
The International Monetary Fund predicted in October that if the status quo held, Saudi Arabia
risked draining its financial reserves in five years.
Indeed, before the first steps of reform had been taken, the government was overspending by an
average 25 to 30 percent a year.
Moreover, the Saudi energy policy of the last few decades focused on provisions regarding energy
supply – projects for the creation of nuclear power plants for instance – instead of those influencing
demand.
Forth these reasons, the Central Bank of Saudi Arabia was the first national institution to call for
reforms at the beginning of 2015.
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According to domestic and international assessments, the objective of the reform will be necessarily
twofold: firstly, it will have to discourage energy overconsumption and waste; secondly, it must free
up more energy resources – especially oil – for export.
On October 27, 2015, after few months devoted to research and collaboration with international
energy experts, the Petroleum and Mineral Resources Minister ‘Ali al‑ Naimi expressed the
governmental attitude towards reforms, in the framework of the Saudi Mining and Minerals
Conference.
On this occasion, he confirmed that the Kingdom was engaged in studies regarding raising domestic
fuel prices and cutting the generous energy subsidies.59
What really characterizes the reform process now ongoing in the Kingdom compared to other
reform experiments is the emphasis placed over the different consequences that the changes are
bound to have over the various social groups.
Indeed, the government is developing a mechanism to provide cash to low- and middle-income
Saudis who used to rely on subsidies, while, under the previous system, 70 percent of the subsidies
benefited high-income people.
Indeed, high-income social groups own more cars, live in bigger houses, and consume more water
and energy than low-income households.
The challenge of removing subsidies on the low-income families and the need to design a policy
that does not marginally burden them has been highlighted, and this is the reason why projects of
cash distribution are being assessed.
During the last few months, authorities have repeatedly underlined that the average Saudi will not
suffer from negative impacts of the reforms.
"We don’t want to change the life of the average Saudi. We want to exert pressure on wealthy
people, those who use resources extensively”.60
Up to now, Saudi Arabia has raised prices for gasoline, electricity and water, but is clearly going to
take more measures to address the problems posed by under-priced fuels.
Inevitably, pollution was another major push-factor for reform, even if further steps are required.
Indeed, even without a pronounced industrial identity, the region has per-capita CO2 emissions that
exceed some of the world’s leading industrial countries.61
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In the framework of the economic renewal and increased awareness, the Kingdom recently
launched Vision 2030, an ambitious set of objectives created by the Council of Economic and
Development Affairs that is likely to place new emphasis on reforms.62
Obviously, the subsidy reform belongs to a broader wave of gradual political renewal, begun with
Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, crowned as the new King of Saudi Arabia on January 23, 2015
following the death of his half-brother, King Abdullah.
In fact, the renewal has not been caused by the mere succession to the throne, but by the ascent of
one of the King’s son, prince Muhammad bin Salman.
At the age of 31, he is the second deputy Prime Minister, the youngest minister of defence in the
world and Chief of the House of the royal court.
More significantly, Muhammad is also chair of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs
and for this reason, he is often considered the power behind the throne of his father.63
Indeed, Prince Muhammad is on the frontline for the cut of subsidies and he also fostered the
creation of Vision 2030 project.
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Even though largely capable of keep the wind of the so-called Arab Springs out of its borders, since
2011 Saudi Arabia has been experiencing new domestic tensions and a slowly growing internal
dissent.
For this reason, it is undeniable that an enlightened, young and energetic prince may help the
Kingdom in keeping pace with the current national conditions.
Indeed, even without a full Arabia Spring, the period 2011-2012 was characterized by repeated
protests, sit-ins and clashed between citizens and security officers.
Many protests over human rights took place in April 2011 in front of government ministry buildings
in Riyadh, Ta'if and Tabuk and in January 2012 in Riyadh, mainly demanding release of prisoners
detained without charge.
As far as the gender gap is concerned, between 2011 and 2012 thousands of women protested for
their right to vote.64
Another gender-related issue regards the right to drive, for which Saudi women have been
organizing campaigns and protests since many years.
In 2015, the former King Abdullah announced women’s participation in the 2015 municipal
elections and eligibility as Consultative Assembly members, while nothing seems to be done for
their right to drive.
Furthermore, the increasing dissent is apparent also in the realm of art and expression,65 and the
case of Raif Badawi, the activist who created the website Free Saudi Liberals, became known
worldwide.66
Prince Muhammad, who often claimed that his vision is a tolerant country with Islam as its
constitution and moderation as its method, will have to answer for these persistent democratic
vacuums, not only from an ethic perspective, but also in order to attract credibility on his economic
and financial enlightened reforms.

Outlooks
As far as citizens’ reception is concerned, the population might reveal a more positive than expected
attitude.
More precisely, even if a large part of the citizenship still opposes paying more for energy
consumption, the awareness of risks and weaknesses of the subsidised system is increasing.
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In other words, the process of acceptance has reached its intermediate level: though still widely
opposed, reform is regarded as a necessary and unavoidable measure.
The ASDA’A Burson-Marsteller67 survey of 3,500 young people in 16 Arab countries found that 78
percent think electricity and fuel should be subsidized by their government and 86 percent agreed in
Saudi Arabia.68
Nevertheless, Saudis are gradually beginning to develop an embryonic environmental and energyrelated consciousness. They are exposed to new messages regarding sustainability, pollution and
changes in the social contract patterns.
While the abovementioned embryonic consciousness is largely taken for granted in other regions of
the world, it is likely to represent a momentous revolution in the very conception of energy for the
Gulf countries.
However, the debate is still underway and it is too early to assess the ultimate consequences of the
reform.
In this respect, according to the majority of data and including future cuts, the subsidy restructuring
is expected to generate $30 billion a year by 2020, part of a broader plan to raise non-oil revenue by
$100 billion to reduce the kingdom’s reliance on crude.
The challenge that Saudi Arabia has still to face consists of respecting the unavoidable gradualness
of the process without letting it run aground due to the fear of internal discontent.
In order to aid low-earning households more than the richer ones, someone suggested to subsidise
other necessities, by using revenues saved from restructured water or energy prices.
While apparently successful in a short-term perspective, this strategy is likely to solve one problem
by introducing another one, ultimately creating a vicious cycle.
A more effective solution would imply the implementation of targeted subsidies, which may benefit
low-income groups.
A possible counter-argument against this idea claims that, without a standard tax-system and an
efficient mechanism of fiscal control, it could be hard to distinguish the rich from the poor, thus
individuating who has the right to subsidies.
Nevertheless, this impediment could be easily overcome by establishing the beneficiaries according
to consumption instead of the declared income.
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By so doing, government should subsidise the first kilowatts each hour or day, leaving the
exceeding consumption unsubsidised, and potentially applying an additional tax to a third, higher
segment of consumption.
Unquestionably, it will be extremely interesting to analyse the future developments of subsidy
reforms not only in Saudi Arabia, but also in the broader Gulf region, also in order to compare a
resource-abundant area with the production and consumption patterns now evolving in importing
countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
The fiscal, environmental, and welfare impacts of energy subsidy reform are potentially enormous.
Eliminating post-tax subsidies in 2015 could raise government revenue by $2.9 trillion (3.6 percent
of global GDP), cut global CO2 emissions by more than 20 percent, and cut pre-mature air pollution
deaths by more than half. After allowing for the higher energy costs faced by consumers, this action
would raise global economic welfare by $1.8 trillion (2.2 percent of global GDP).69
In this respect, the following section of the paper will investigate the context of MENA nations that
import resources, providing a comparison of the subsidies’ management of importing and exporting
countries.
In order to highlight similarities and differences, Egypt will be chosen as the second case study,
which might corroborate the hypothesis that subsidy reforms are becoming increasingly compelling
both in exporting and in importing MENA countries, despite their economic, social, political and
historical differences.
3. Importing Countries
As a matter of common knowledge, importing countries show hugely different geopolitical,
economic and social characteristics from those of the exporting countries, and the two conjunctures
are hardly comparable.
Nevertheless, as in resource-abundant countries, the need for subsidy reform is becoming
increasingly urgent and the international pressures have been highlighting the imperative to reform
and the many shortcomings of the subsidised system.

3.1 Similarities and differences in comparison to rentier states
As mentioned above, rentier states and importing countries, and more broadly Gulf countries and
the other Middle Eastern nations, are extremely different from both an economic and an energetic
perspective.
It is undeniable that Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for instance, are hardly comparable.
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Nevertheless, as far as subsidies’ effects and consequences are concerned, the two groups of
countries show two significant similarities, namely the international pressures towards reform and
the mechanism subsidy/low democratic demands.
Speaking about international pressures, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank
have repeatedly urged countries to take steps towards credible subsidy reforms.
The International Monetary Fund for instance, has been invoking subsidy reform since more than a
decade. In a recent report, it highlights that energy subsidies are dramatically higher than expected
and that estimates for global energy subsidies in 2011 have been revised to US $ 4.2 trillion, more
than double the US $ 2.0 trillion previously reported in a 2013 IMF book, Energy Subsidy Reform:
Lessons and Implications.70
According to other IMF estimates, pre-tax energy subsidies in the region amounted to $237 billion
in 2011, equivalent to 48 percent of world subsidies, 8.6 percent of regional GDP, or 22 percent of
government revenue.71
Similarly, the World Bank has been underlying the shortcomings of the subsidised systems since
years ago, and in 2014 it created a new facility to help countries reform their energy subsidies and
put in place social protection measures to help low income citizens during the process, the Energy
Subsidy Reform Technical Assistance and Delivery Facility, led by the Bank’s Energy Sector
Management Assistance Program (ESMAP).
In 2010, long before the implementation of the first reforms in the Middle East, the World Bank
gave also some suggestions regarding how to perform the awaited changes. For instance, it stated
that the credibility of the government’s plan to compensate vulnerable groups is important for
public acceptance, as is its plan to use the funds freed from subsidy reform for social and economic
benefits.
Furthermore, international institutions highlighted that a well‐ organized publicity campaign would
have been essential.
Governments can reduce uncertainty and persuade the public that the effects will not be as
deleterious as might be feared by explaining the need for change and the compensating measures
that will be implemented.72
Besides these significant data and suggestions, the international organizations have been claiming
that, in economies with large energy consumption, the extra demand for energy induced by the
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lower consumer prices can work against energy security and have global effects by possibly raising
prices on the world market by increasing demand (in the case of widely traded fuels).73
Secondly, energy exporting and importing countries share the self-reinforcing mechanism through
which the power provides low fiscal pressure and free or cheap goods, mainly energy, in return for
low democratic demands and the tacit acceptance of a repressive political control.
Stated differently, the principle does not really change. What changes is the extent to which
governments can exploit it to rule, which is obviously larger in contexts with bigger GDP, smaller
numbers of citizens and inhabitants, and stronger economies. Therefore, it will tend to be larger in
the exporting/rentier states than in importing countries like Egypt.
3.2 The case of Egypt: el-Sīsī energy policies between past and future
Egypt represents an ideal case study not only because it has a long tradition of subsidies, but also
because, since his election, President el-Sīsī has been trying to implement significant reforms of the
hugely subsidised system.
Furthermore, the fragile socio-economic equilibrium and the persistent tensions in the country make
it possible to observe the complex interaction between socio-political issues and energy subsidy
reform.
Egypt has the third-largest population in Africa, after Nigeria and Ethiopia, and the third highest
gross national income (GNI), after Nigeria and South Africa.
Egypt's economy suffered during and after the 2011 revolution as the country experienced a sharp
decline in tourism revenue and foreign direct investment. According to the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), annual gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Egypt dropped from 5.1% in 2010 to
1.8% in 2011 and remained below the pre-revolution level, averaging 2.1% in 2013.74
With all probabilities, only financial support from some Persian Gulf countries has helped Egypt
meet its domestic energy demand.
Decades ago, in 1977, Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat attempted to remove the flour, rice and
cooking oil subsidies: the result was a near-revolution that saw hundreds of thousands of protesters
descend on the capital and the hasty re-implementation of the subsidy system.
Due to similar reactions and the fear of losing popular consent, governments have protected the
subsidised system until few years ago, even though the need for reforms was becoming increasingly
urgent.
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Indeed, as far as Egypt is concerned, over the past five years the annual energy production grew on
average by 1% compared to annual average consumption growth of 5.3%, thus creating an
increasing gap between supply and demand.75
Egypt is the largest non-OPEC oil producer in Africa, and the continent’s largest consumer of oil
and natural gas, which account for 94% of Egypt’s primary energy consumption.
Energy demand is increasing rapidly as the result of population growth and the increased demand is
posing a challenge for Egypt’s government as production of oil and gas is falling, and oil
consumption has outpaced production since 2010. Combined with aging infrastructure, this is
causing frequent electricity blackouts all over the country.
In 2013, the annus horribilis of the Egyptian politics76, subsidies to fossil fuel consumption
accounted for 12% of Egypt’s GDP or US$32 billion and absorbed around 20% of public spending
(exceeding expenditure on health, education and infrastructure combined), making Egypt the
world’s eighth largest spender on fossil fuel subsidies.77
The high cost of energy subsidies in Egypt has contributed to the country's high budget deficit and
the inability of the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC), the country's national oil
company, to pay off its debt to foreign operators. EGPC owes foreign oil and natural gas operators
billions of dollars, which has led foreign operators to delay their investments in existing and new oil
and natural gas projects.
As far as gas is concerned, Egypt is the largest gas consumer in Africa, accounting for 40% of dry
natural gas consumption in Africa in 2013.
Much of the natural gas consumed in Egypt is used to fuel electric power plants. Furthermore, the
Egyptian government encourages households, businesses, and the industrial sector to consider
natural gas as a substitute for petroleum products and coal.
In January 2008, the World Bank approved loans for the Natural Gas Connections Project, which
aims to switch consumption of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) to natural gas through investment in
new connections and to further expand natural gas use in densely populated, low-income areas.
Moreover, the share of natural gas consumed in the transportation sector also increased after the
development of compressed natural gas (CNG) infrastructure and vehicles.
In this context, Egypt experiences frequent electricity blackouts because of rising demand, natural
gas supply shortages, aging infrastructure, and inadequate generation and transmission capacity.
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Inevitably, ongoing political and social unrest in Egypt has slowed the government's plans to
expand power generation capacity by 30 gigawatts by 2020, and now it seems to be a utopian goal.
As far as the motor fuels and LPG are concerned, they are subsidised for general consumption, and
natural gas and fuel subsidies are provided to energy-intensive industries in order to promote their
competitiveness.
Moreover, expenditure on a variety of fuels accounts for around 70% of total spending on subsidies,
and Egypt imports a number of fuel types – including around 50% of the butane, which is widely
used in canister form by Egyptian households.
As far as the energy sector is concerned, a further consequence of the political and social unrest
begun in 2011 was that the lower security led to a marked increase in illegal butane trading, which
in turn resulted in the reduced availability of subsidised stock. The consequent protests, which
accompanied each butane crisis, served as a reminder of the politically sensitive nature of the
subsidy issue.
Indeed, as in the other MENA countries, the subsidized system proved to favour the economic - and
political - élites. In 2013 for instance, the Egyptian Ministry of Petroleum found that 92% of petrol
subsidies and 66% of natural gas subsidies went to the richest 20% of consumers.78
According to other estimates, Egypt’s expenditure on energy subsidies reached a staggering EGP
143.7 billion (close to USD 21 billion) in the financial year 2013/14, a figure representing 19.5 per
cent of total government spending, or almost the entire value of aid received by Egypt from Middle
Eastern donors since mid-2012.
The following fiscal year, 2014/2015, pushed by the fall in global crude oil prices that was
occurring since mid-2014, the cost of oil product subsidies fell to 70 billion Egyptian pounds ($ 9.2
billion) thanks to the subsidy reform.
At the same time, however, electricity subsidies increased and costed 27.4 billion Egyptian pounds
($ 3.6 billion).79
In June 2014, the government announced the incumbent reform through a national media campaign
aimed at explaining the rationale for the prices increases to citizens.
Even before, right after the fall of Morsi, the military-backed interim government also strongly
indicated its intention of implementing subsidy reform. It began a pilot scheme to give “smart
cards” to drivers, which they present when buying petrol or diesel at petrol stations—at first for
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tracking rather than cost-control purposes.80 (Farid, 2013; Fick, 2013). The interim government also
distributed coupons for butane cooking gas cylinders to holders of ration cards, beginning in
January 2014, limiting the number available at the existing, heavily subsidized price (IRIN, 2013).
Nevertheless, despite all these tweaks, the prices for all refined products had continued to decline in
real terms, pushing the subsidies’ cost as a proportion of budget spending up to 22 per cent by
2013—over 30 per cent if the electricity sector is included.
Egypt introduced long-awaited energy subsidy cuts. These had been in the pipeline for over five
years, but repeatedly delayed by political instability. Their announcement was therefore seen as a
sign of consolidation by the new President, Abdel-Fattah al-Sisi, as well as a positive signal to
external investors.
The most significant step was the 64 per cent hike in diesel prices, but similar increases affected
electricity and a wide range of refined products—the most notable exclusion being heavily
subsidized liquefied petroleum gas (LPG).81
Both the Egyptian President and his cabinet presented the reform as a bitter pill82, calling people to
make sacrifice in order to save money for their own country.
What the campaign advertised most was the possibility of a different allocation of the saved money.
Indeed, the political establishment repeatedly emphasized that almost half would have been
allocated to education and health.83
Besides, President’s rhetoric presents his mission as a war to rebuild Egypt, which implies that
whoever opposes his reforms is not interested in country’s fate.
As far as the implementation is concerned, the government has put forward a medium-term
macroeconomic policy framework. It covers the fiscal years from 2014/15 to 2018/19, according to
which it plans to reduce the fiscal deficit from 12.6 per cent to 8.5 per cent of GDP, and its public
debt burden from 97 per cent to within 80 to 85 per cent of GDP, in five years.84
In this framework, energy subsidy reform was aimed to play a major role for the fiscal adjustment,
and it forecasted compensation mechanisms for vulnerable households involving an expanded cash
transfer program.
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Nevertheless, according to the majority of commentators85, compensation measures to reduce the
impact of the subsidy cuts put in place by the government have so far been extremely limited.
Moreover, while beginning to remove some subsidies, government expanded the food subsidy
system was expanded, with twenty further products including certain meats, vegetables and dairy
products. This was in addition to government distributions of bread, rice, sugar, tea, flour and oil.
The rationale behind this provision implied not touching food subsidies as politically sensitive
issues. The government also made some efforts to support the poor and lower middle classes by
attempting to restrain public transport costs, with President stating that minibus86 fares should only
increase slightly. In general, however, this is a largely privatized sector over which the government
has relatively little control, and independent minibus operators doubled prices immediately
following the subsidy cuts—arguably a reasonable response to the sharp increase in costs of diesel
and engine oil.
For electricity subsidies on the other hand, the government declared in September 2014 that they
would have been removed over the same five-year period, rather than over three years, as
previously stated.87
Overall, the energy subsidy reforms raised the prices of various energy products, but – according to
the insightful analysis carried out by Laura James –they did not alter the fixed basis on which they
are set in local currency, which is a key aspect of existing supply chains, including a mix of stateowned and private companies.88 Consequently, there is still no automatic link to international
prices.

Outlooks
From the present analysis, it is clear that Egyptian subsidy reforms belong to a wider set of policies
closely intertwined.
Indeed, the first aim of the current administration has been to achieve this recovery through the
exploitation of three major fields: further support from the Gulf States, increased foreign
investment, including in “mega-projects”, and energy subsidy reforms.89
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These three policies are interrelated: Gulf allies would have hesitated to continue to transfer funds
into the highly subsidised economy of the country, while potential investors were looking for
energy subsidy reforms as an indicator that the administration was determined in its efforts towards
an improved economic management.
As in the case of the exporting countries, no reliable consumption data are yet available to show the
longer-term impact of the subsidy reforms, but they are unlikely to have been steep enough to
contain the long-term rising trend of energy usage in Egypt.90
After the reform, the International Monetary Fund expressed its approval for the steps taken, at the
same time highlighting the need for further subsidy reforms in the next fiscal years, specifically
aimed at keeping expenditure in check, reducing energy supply bottlenecks and raising potential
growth, as well as ensuring a stronger social protection.91
Anyhow, the new economic path undertaken by the Egyptian President clearly indicates the
willingness to improve the relationship between the country and the International Monetary Fund,
which would provide a more specific framework for ongoing reform, and would be welcomed as
additional assurance by Gulf allies, thus letting them be more inclined to continue providing
financial assistance.92
Businesses and potential investors will also be looking for evidence of continued commitment.
More broadly, continued reform would be imperative to address Egypt’s pressing energy supply
constraints,93 thus providing an ongoing source of motivation and possibly enabling the country to
repay its debts to international energy companies and sign new contracts.94
As far as the future initiatives are concerned, Egypt is also planning to expand its power system
interconnection with countries in the Middle East and Africa. Egypt and Saudi Arabia signed a $1.6
billion deal to connect the two countries with a 3,000 MW electricity cable. This project will
expand each country's electricity capacity, especially during peak demand times. According to
Business Monitor International (BMI) Research, peak demand times are at different times in the
two countries. Peak demand times are between noon and midnight in Saudi Arabia and after sunset
in Egypt. Consequently, the connection will provide both Saudi Arabia and Egypt with an extra
power source to mitigate peak demand shortfalls. The project's construction is expected to be
completed in 2018.
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Regarding alternative energy, Egypt's first solar-thermal power plant, located in Kuraymat - south
of Cairo – has been operational since June 2011 with the capacity of generating 140 MW of solarthermal energy. The plant uses concentrated solar power (CSP) with back-up natural gas-fired
generators. The World Bank and the Japan International Cooperation Agency helped finance the
construction of the solar-thermal plant. Furthermore, Egypt is planning to build a 140 MW solar
power plant along the Red Sea coast and a 100 MW plant in Kom Ombo, so increasing country’s
solar generation capacity by 3,500 MW by 2027.
Fro both an Egyptian and Italian perspective, a major event that must not underestimated is the
discovery by Eni of a supergiant natural gas field in 2015.
In August 2015, Eni announced that it has discovered a “supergiant” natural gas field. The
discovery was made about 120 miles off the coast of Egypt, in the company’s Zohr prospect, at a
depth of nearly 5,000 feet.
According to the majority of studies, it could potentially hold 30 trillion cubic feet of gas within a
100 square kilometer area, making it one of the world’s largest natural gas finds, which would
probably be able to satisfying Egypt’s natural gas demand for decades. This discovery could also
provide about 5.5 billion barrels of oil.95
For these reasons, it will be extremely interesting to observe how the involved players will reshape
the energy sector management of the country and to assess the new attitudes of the Egyptian
General Petroleum Corporation (EGPC). It is the national oil company, which is responsible for
managing upstream and downstream activities particularly through its main subsidiary, the General
Petroleum Company, which holds several exploration licenses in the Sinai, the Gulf of Suez, and
the Western Desert.
As the abovementioned discovery clearly shows, international oil companies (IOCs) also play a
large role in Egypt's upstream oil sector, holding shares in producing assets in partnership with
EGPC. Eni, BP, BG, and Apache are the major oil and natural gas players in Egypt, with the first
three primarily invested offshore and Apache in the onshore Western Desert.
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Conclusions
During the last decade and after the Arab uprisings in particular, the debate over susidy reforms in
the Middle East gained momentum.
Even though after the turmoil the average subsidy spending in the MENA region raised in response
to the wave of strengthened social demands, after the first post-revolutionary phase, the increasing
awareness of the unsustainability of subsidized systems led several MENA countries to take steps to
lower subsidies, especially as far as the energy sector was concerned.
Inevitably, the issue of energy and energy revenues management has been placed side by side with
that of the so-called social contract, which includes the processes of creation and legitimization of
authority and the response of individuals and societal aggregates.
As the present analysis has showed, the multiple links between energy and power are particularly
apparent in the concept of rentier state, the resource-course theories and the comparison between
the resource-abundant countries, which export energy, and the importing nations.
For many years, reducing energy subsidies in the MENA region has represented a sort of taboo. For
citizens, energy subsidies have served as a key social safety net, while for rulers, they have been
used for limiting equality and social justice demands, thus forcing people to comply with the
entrenched status quo.
At the same time, Middle Eastern and North African countries were exposed to what has been
called international pressure exerted by institutions like the International Energy Agency (IEA), the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to limit national spending for subsidies.
Nevertheless, in the last three years - given the low oil prices - MENA governments have been
acknowledging that the subsidised system distorts market trends, fosters inefficient use of resources,
depresses foreign direct investment and fuels overconsumption, which is no longer sustainable,
particularly as far as the population growth in most of the MENA countries is concerned. Between
2013 and 2014 nearly thirty countries undertook energy sector reforms, among which there are
Tunisia, Egypt, Iran, United Arab Emirates, while Saudi Arabia inaugurated projects of reforms in
2015.
Now that oil prices are slowing surging again, it is important for the MENA countries not to
abandon the ongoing processes of reform.
Unquestionably, thanks to the rise in prices, Energy companies in the Middle East reduced their
borrowing by 26 percent in 2016, as the provided revenues needed for exploration and production.
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Moreover, bonds and loans issued by energy producers in the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council
declined 26 percent to $17.5 billion from a record $23.7 billion in 2015.96
The key to success will be carrying out reforms even though prices get higher: the low prices of the
last few years must well be considered a push factor, but not the only reason to implement change.
However, as explained before, the energy landscape of the Middle East and North Africa is
developing quickly, and the developments are not related to subsidy only, but also to other major
issues such as the renewable energies, nuclear power and the future partnerships within and outside
the region.
Saudi Arabia for instance, the state that better represents the exporting countries, announced at the
beginning of the year an investment outlay of up to $50 billion in the short term. Obviously, the
country has been struggling with low oil prices and budget deficits plans, and wants to rely more on
renewables, emulating the United Arab Emirates.
Saudi Arabia is launching in the next few weeks the first round of bids for a massive
During the recent World Future Energy Summit in Abu Dhabi (16-19 January 2017), Saudi
speakers stated that in the next few weeks the Kingdom will be launching the first bid round of
massive programme of 10 gigawatts of $30 to $50 billion by 2023, while Some bid rounds will go
shortly after that.
At the same time, Saudi Arabia plans to build two nuclear reactors with a total capacity of 2.8
gigawatts.
Perhaps most importantly, Saudi Arabia seems also to be working on an interconnection of renewable
energy project that will connect the Kingdom to Yemen, Jordan and Egypt to exchange non-fossil
sources of energy.

While this project is undoubtedly interesting, it is hard to deny that Saudi Arabia will not be able to
overlook the geopolitical scenarios involving the mentioned country and its relation with them,
Yemen in primis.
Anyhow, Saudi Arabia is obviously aiming at taking some step forward into their role of energy star
in the region. Saudi Arabia’s ACWA Power for instance, has recently agreed with the government
of Jordan to develop, finance, construct, own and operate a new 61.3 megawatts photovoltaic
project in Risha, a province in Eastern Jordan. The project was announced jointly by the Jordanian
Minister of Energy and Mineral Resources Ibrahim Saif, and Mohammad Abu Nayyan, Chairman
of ACWA Power.
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Even as far as the importing countries are concerned both the process of reforms and the
establishment of new partnership are still ongoing.
In Egypt for instance, in January the Egyptian Electricity Holding Company (EEHC) has signed a
$61.68 million deal with South Korea’s Doosan Group for the supply of power plant equipment.
The deal is expected to include the supply of a 650MW turbine, condensers, and generators for the
Assiut power plant, and the project is expected to start at the end of 2019.97
At the same time, France plans to provide 175 million euros to finance Egypt's energy sector too.
According to the Egyptian official declarations, 150 million euros of the total funding will be
allocated for electricity and 25 million euros for oil.
Among the project discussed were the Alexandria Tram Development Project, the Alexandria West
Wastewater Treatment Plant Expansion and Upgrade Project, and the Healthcare Development
Program in Egypt’s governorates.98
In conclusion, assessing the overall impact of subsidy reform would be premature and simplistic.
Nevertheless, the first steps – even though not sufficient - have been favourably welcomed by the
international institutions.
Similarly, the abovementioned projects of countries like Saudi Arabia and Egypt deserve increasing
attention, since the next few years will represent a fundamental phase of the energy reconfiguration
within the region.

97

Egypt signs $61.1m Deal with South Korea, Africa’s Power Journal, January 18, 2017: [https://www.esiafrica.com/news/egypt-signs-61-6m-deal-with-south-korea/].
98
“France to provide 175 mln euros to fund Egypt’s energy sector”, Ahramonline, December 27, 2016:
[http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/253952/Business/Economy/France-to-provide--mln-euros-to-fundEgypts-energy.aspx].
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